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CONTINUED TURBULENCE IN
"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES"
William T Gorton III, Esq. *
INTRODUCTION
As a broad goal, Congress passed the Clean Water Act
(CWA) to restore and maintain the "chemical, physical and
biologic integrity of the Nation's waters."' Adapting the law to
such a scientific-based policy has been difficult and the subject of
dispute for forty years. Under the authority of the Constitution's
Commerce Clause, Congress, acting through the CWA, asserted
federal control over the nation's "navigable waters,"
2 which the
statute defines as "waters of the United States .... "3 Finding the
distinction between these two terms in describing the nation's
water resources has since caused problems and, consequently,
resulted in the expansion of federal environmental regulatory
jurisdiction across the country. It has also been a long-time
source of considerable tension across the nation as surprised
citizens, industries, and organizations find that activities on their
properties are subject to federal regulation.
Congress tasked the then-newly-formed Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) with determining how extensive federal permitting and
regulating activities of American waterways should be under the
two systems.4 The permitting mechanism and related regulations
(i.e., the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit), adopted to reduce pollution from point-source
discharges under CWA Section 402, establishes the permittee's
"end of pipe" water discharge quality.5 Though the NPDES
program is administered nationally by the EPA, the CWA allows
*Member, Stites and Harbison, PLLC; Assistant Professor, Adjunct, Natural
Resources and Environmental Sciences at the University of Kentucky College of
Agriculture.
I 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1987).
2 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
333 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1987).
See 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a) (2000). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been
involved in regulating certain activities in the nation's waters since 1890 and until 1968,
the primary thrust of the Corps' regulatory program was the protection of navigation, 33
U.S.C. § 1344(a)-(c) (1987).
5 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2014).
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states to administer certain aspects of the CWA, with EPA
approval, under the principles of cooperative federalism.6 In
Kentucky, the NPDES program is administered by the Kentucky
Energy and Environment Cabinet, Department of Environmental
Protection, Division of Water Quality (KY DEP).7
Not only does the CWA regulate the quality of discharges
into the waters of the United States, but it also regulates certain
activities in water bodies that can obstruct or affect water
quality.8 Consequently, a permit from the Corps is required for a
party wishing to "discharge dredged or fill material into
navigable waters."9 That is, under CWA Section 404,10 any
digging in or disposing of materials in the waters of the United
States requires a permit, commonly known as a "404 permit."
Although the CWA allows the states to assume jurisdiction of the
"404 Program,"" Kentucky, like most states, does not administer
the program.12 Hence, any dredging or filling in the waters
requires federal approval.13
Due to the difference between the terms "navigable
waters" and "waters of the United States" within the statute
itself, it is not surprising that there has been confusion across the
nation regarding the reach of federal jurisdiction to the
application of Section 404. To understand the legal dilemma, one
must focus on the basic terms as defined by the agencies and the
courts.
6 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (regarding the NPDES permitting program); see
also 33 U.S.C. § 1318(c) (regarding inspections, monitoring and entry associated with
point sources).
7 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.70-100 to -150 (West 2018); see also 401 KY.
ADMIN. REGS. 5:002-5:310 (2018) (permitting program regulating point source discharges
in Kentucky is referred to as the "KPDES" program).
8 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
9 Id.
10 Id.
I Id. at (g)-(h).
12 The KY DEP does maintain some jurisdiction over activities resulting in
permanent loss of streams and wetlands through what is referred to as the "401 Water
Quality Certification" requirements. In its basic framework, the KY DEP is required to
certify whether activities under a federal permit or license (i.e., 404 permit) will comply
with other state water quality standards, 401 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 9:020 (2018).
13 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1977).
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A. 'Navigable Waters"
"Navigable waters" historically only included those that
were navigable in fact;14 the term eventually found a statutory
home in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.15 Over time, the
term has expanded to include much smaller waterways. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "navigable waters"
includes "all waters of the United States"-a legal fiction that
Justice White acknowledged in reconciling the plain meaning of
the term with the expanded regulatory reach.16 He reasoned that
Congress evidently intended to reject limits that had been placed
on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes
and exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate
at least some waters that would not be deemed "'navigable' under"
the classical understanding of that term."'7 Following this
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the federal
agencies have defined "waters of the United States" to encompass
not only traditional navigable waters used in interstate
commerce, but also tributaries of those traditional navigable
waterways and adjacent wetlands,18 intermittent water channels,
and even areas that would be perceived as dry lands to the
untrained eye. Moreover, Congress left it to the agencies to
determine just how far upstream bodies of water could be
designated "water[s] of the United States" under federal
regulation.19 The agencies eventually followed the Commerce
Clause upstream all the way to ephemeral streams and intrastate
isolated wetlands.20 This practice presented a critical question:
What is the outer geographical imit of CWA jurisdiction?
"^ See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (rivers "are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water.").
'5 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2016) (enacted March 3, 1899).
IS United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
17 Id.
's See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), (a)(5), (a)(7) (2017).
19 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)-(c) (2016).
20 CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43455, EPA AND THE ARMY
CORPS' RULE TO DEFINE "WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES" 3 (2017).
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B. EPA and The Corps-Joint Jurisdiction?
Both the EPA and the Corps have jurisdiction under
Section 404 and have broadly defined "waters of the United
States."21 Both agencies have also included wetlands adjacent to
those waters in their definitions, despite the fact that wetlands
are never expressly mentioned in the CWA.2 2
The CWA has two permitting schemes for protecting water
quality: (1) the "Section 402" NPDES program administered by
the EPA (and analogous KPDES program administered by KY
DEP), regarding pollutant discharges; and (2) the "Section 404"
program regarding certain "activities in the water bodies,"
primarily administrated by the Corps.23 The Section 404 program
provides an exception to the NPDES discharge requirements,
allowing discharges of dredge or fill materials into waters
requiring specific permitting criteria.24 The 404 permittee must,
however, minimize stream impacts and mitigate for unavoidable
losses of stream or aquatic feature functions by restoring,
recreating, or preserving other waters (i.e., mitigation).25
Although the Corps has the primary authority for
approving 404 permitting activities regarding "waters of the
United States," the CWA gives the EPA the ultimate authority to
"prohibit the specification (including withdrawal of specification)
of any defined area as a disposal site [for dredge or fill
materiall."26 In other words, all 404 permits issued by the Corps
are subject to the EPA's veto,2 7 following notice and an
opportunity for a public hearing to determine whether the permit
will have an adverse effect.28
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Act (CWA) Compliance
Monitoring, U. S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/compliance/clean-water-act-
cwa-compliance-monitoring [https://perma.cc/2BFQ-MTTR].
24 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a) (2017).
25 33 C.F.R. § 332.1(c)(2) (2017); 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a) (2017).
26 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2016); but see Nat'i Min. Ass'n v. Jackson, 856 F. Supp. 2d
150, 155 (D.D.C. 2012) (where the court held that the EPA exceeded its authority in
assuming a broad role in reviewing 404 permits associated with surface coal mining).
27 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2016) (stating that permits are "subject to" 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(c)); see also 40 C.F.R. § 231.1(a) (2017) (noting Administrator's "veto").
2 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2016).
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C. What Activities Require Permits?
A party must obtain a Section 404 permit from the Corps
to conduct activities in the water courses subject to 404
jurisdiction.29 The CWA generally describes 404 regulated
activities as "the discharge of dredged or filled material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites."30 Notably, however,
that statute captures almost any activity where one would
disturb or change the bottom elevation of a water course or body,
by dredging, filling, or conducting construction activities
therein.31 That includes constructing outfall and intake
structures, pipeline crossings, road crossings, bank stabilization,
hydropower projects, docks, submerged utility lines, harbor pile
development, residential developments, de-watering agricultural*
land, and almost any activity that can be imagined in the
"waters" of the Unites States. For clarification, "the term dredged
material means material that is excavated or dredged from the
waters of the United States."3 2 The phrase "discharge of dredged
or fill materials" means any "addition of dredged material into ...
the waters of the United States ... , 33 including any addition of
excavated material into the waters of the United States from any
activity, including mechanized land clearing, ditching
channelization, or any other excavation.34 The latter definition is
broad, encompassing many activities especially in the land
development, natural resource extraction, and agricultural
businesses where landowners have "filled" wetlands for
development; mining companies have filled ephemeral headwater
drainage channels for mine spoil storage; and farmers have
drained wetlands or built impoundments in surface drainage
channels. Ultimately, almost any activity in the waters of the
United States, whether on public or private property, requires
approval from the federal government. Within this statutory and
regulatory framework, the following discussions address the
tension between environmental protection and private property
29 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2016); 33 C.F.R. § 320.3(0) (2017).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (2017) (emphasis added).
33 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1) (2017) (emphasis added).
3 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (2017).
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rights resulting in frequent litigation across the country. This in
turn presents a follow-up question: What are waters of the
United States?
I. JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLD ISSUES: THE GOVERNMENT REACH
A. Courts Define "Waters"
Following the agencies' adoption of broad definitions of
jurisdictional waters, it was not surprising to see the reach of
regulatory authority extend upstream to headwater, intermittent
and wet weather ephemeraf streams, and isolated intrastate-
isolated impoundments and water bodies, and wetlands.35
Consequently, it is also not surprising that the issue of federal
CWA jurisdiction has been before the Supreme Court three times
since 1985.36 Property owners discovered jurisdictional waters of
the United States on their tracts and became entangled in
property rights disputes that complicated federal regulatory
efforts.37
Each Supreme Court decision was followed by significant
litigation in the lower federal courts.38 The agencies attempted to
conform their policies to the Court's congressionally inspired
interpretation of what constituted "waters of the United States."39
Akin to the complexity of an aquatic ecosystem, agencies and
federal courts have continuously attempted to clarify this area of
environmental law." Although the regulatory framework
surrounding potential 404 program activities affected many
segments of the economy, certain industries, such as agriculture,
natural resource extraction, and land development are
particularly impacted.41 Not only may these industries' private
property rights be affected, but they may also be subject to civil
35 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
36 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985);
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174
(2001) (rejecting "Migratory Bird Rule" basis for jurisdiction) [hereinafter "SWAACC];
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 757 (2006).
3 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985).
38 See id.
3 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.
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penalties of up to $25,000 per day for each violation.
4 2 Also, there
are criminal enforcement actions, including imprisonment and
fines, for violations of Section 404 and its permitting
requirements.43
B. Adjacent Wetlands
In the first Supreme Court case, United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, a Michigan land developer challenged
the Corps' authority to restrict land development in wetlands
that did not have a direct physical connection to a traditionally
navigable waterway.44 The developer was placing fill materials on
his property adjacent to the shores of Lake St. Clair, Michigan.
4 5
Nevertheless, the Court held that CWA jurisdiction extends to
intrastate wetlands adjacent to, but not directly connected with, a
larger body of water that ultimately flows into a navigable
waterway "if it performs a greater ecological function beyond the
wetland."4 6 The Court, in reviewing Congressional intent,
47
recognized that it is often difficult to determine where water ends
and land begins.48 The Court found that "the regulation of
activities that cause water pollution cannot rely on ... artificial
lines ... but must focus on all waters that together form the
aquatic system."49 The Court seemed to acknowledge both the
functional values of the intact ecosystem and a broader view of
environmental protection.5 0 Perhaps foreshadowing the next case,
42 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
4 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); see, e.g., Pozsgai v. United States, 999 F.2d 719, 723 (3rd
Cir. 1993) (where landowner John Pozsgai was charged with forty counts of knowingly
filling wetlands without a 404 permit in Bucks County, PA and was sentenced to, inter
alia, three years in prison); see also, United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 350 (5th Cir.
2008) (where the developer was sentenced to nine years in prison and significant fines for
filling in wetlands and selling property to low-income families); see also, United States v.
Robertson, 875 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 2017) (where Robertson built ponds on
federal and private lands to facilitate his gold mining operation in Montana).
44 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
45 Id. at 124.
46 Id. at 131; Jared Fish, United States v. Robison- The Case for Restoring Broad
Jurisdictional Authority Under the Federal Clean Water Act in the Wake of Rapanos'
Muddied Waters, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 561, 562 (2009).
4 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
48 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).
4 Id. at 133-34.
5o Id.
2432016-20171
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the Court noted that isolated bodies of water do not have a
continuous surface connection.
C Isolated Water Bodies1
The agencies continued to expand their CWA jurisdiction
to the point of regulating isolated, man-made ponds and land
features until the Court's 2001 decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. US. Army Corps of Engineers
(SWANCC).52 In that case, the Corps exerted jurisdiction over an
abandoned sand and gravel pit containing isolated, non-
navigable, intrastate, "permanent and seasonal ponds."53 The site
was being permitted as a landfill to serve the City of Chicago and,
like many abandoned quarries, contained impounded water.54
The Corps based its authority on its "Migratory Bird Rule," which
extended jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause by finding a
nexus to interstate commerce since migratory birds visited the
site.5 5 In SWANCC, the Supreme Court struck down the broad
Migratory Bird Rule, noting that it was not within the scope of
the CWA authority.56 Although the SWANCC decision trimmed
the Corps' reach under Section 404, the agency still maintained
significant authority over navigable waters, tributaries to
navigable waters, wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, and
wetlands adjacent to the tributaries of navigable waters.5 7 The
Corps continued to assert jurisdiction broadly, ultimately
reaching activities allegedly affecting the hydrologic regime far
removed from traditionally navigable waters of the United
States.58 The Corps' extensive reach was challenged and came to
51 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (examples include intrastate lakes, rivers, streams,
including intermittent streams, mud flats, sand flats, wetlands, sloughs or prairie
potholes).
52 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001).
53 Id. at 164.
54 Id.
55 See 51 Fed. Reg. 41.206, 41.217 (1986). The preamble of the regulation the
Corps relied on said "waters of the United States" extended to waters that are used to
irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce and waters that are or could be used as habitat
by migratory birds or endangered species.
56 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
57 Id. at 173.
58 United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
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a head in 2006 for the third time in two consolidated Sixth
Circuit cases in United States v. Rapanos.59
D. Remote Waters-The Rapanos Decision
John Rapanos was a land developer in Michigan who, in
the late 1980s, began excavating earth and digging ditches on his
property to drain moist areas which discharged into nearby
wetlands.60 These wetlands were adjacent to non-navigable
waters and up to twenty acres from a recognized navigable
waterway: Saginaw Bay.61 Although Rapanos' property was
connected to Saginaw Bay by twenty acres of ditches, the Corps
charged that he was hydrologically connected to waters of the
United States.62 He was convicted on criminal charges, fined
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and ordered to perform two
hundred hours of community service.63
In Rapanos, once again, the Supreme Court addressed the
jurisdictional reach of the CWA and, particularly, whether it
extended to non-navigable wetlands that were not adjoined to
navigable waters.64 In what became a source of frustration for the
environmental bar, the Court exacerbated confusion about the
reach of federal authority by issuing five separate opinions:65 one
plurality opinion, two concurring opinions, and two dissenting
opinions, with no single opinion commanding a majority of the
Court.6 6 A majority did find that the Corps' definition of "waters
of the United States" was overly broad as it allowed, as a matter
of course, jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable
waters.67 Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the
59 United States v. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (this case was consolidated
with Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004) at the Supreme
Court and decided under Rapanos).
6o Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 632.
61 Id. at 634.
62 Id. at 633.
63 Id.
64 See id. at 722.
65 Id. at 715.
66 Id.
67 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion), 781-82
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
2016-20171 245
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matter to the Sixth Circuit. The Court did so, however, after
providing multiple definitions for the disputed phrase.68
E Justice Scaha vs. Justice Kennedy
Most of the analysis of the Rapanos decision focused on
the four-member plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia,69
and the concurring opinion authored by Justice Kennedy's.70 The
confusion induced by the complexity of the opinions regarding the
post-Rapanos tandard for Section 404 jurisdiction cannot be
overstated.
Scalia limited jurisdiction to "relatively permanent
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water" and "wetlands
with a continuous surface connection" to such waters-that is, an
"I know it when I see it" sort of definition.71 Alternatively,
Kennedy found that all waters possessing a "significant nexus"to
navigable waters were jurisdictional waters-a definition more in
line with ecological principles.72 Kennedy further found that a
determination of whether there is a significant nexus to
navigable waters requires a case-by-case analysis of whether
wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated
lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily
understood as navigable.73
8 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); see Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758-86, 793.
6( See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719-57 (plurality opinion). In deciding how to
interpret a plurality opinion, particularly one as splintered as Rapanos, many courts have
studied the law regarding interpretation of fragmented court decisions. Several have cited
Marks v. United States to discern the holding in Rapanos. Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977). The Marks case quotes Gregg v. George, where the Supreme Court
instructed that "when a fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, 'the holding of the court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."' Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. George, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)).
70 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 732, 742.
72 Id. at 779.
73 See id. at 782 (citing the purpose of the CWA).
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F Lower Courts'Interpretation of Rapanos
Interpretations of Section 404 of the CWA under Rapanos
have grown increasingly complex and only exacerbated the
problem.74 Chief Justice Roberts recognized the difficulty that
Rapanos would cause: "It is unfortunate that no opinion
commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read
Congress' limits on the reach of the CWA. Lower courts and
regulated entities now have to feel their way on a case-by-case
basis."75
Since Rapanos, the courts of appeals have split on whether
to follow the Scalia test, Kennedy test, or neither.76 A Kentucky
U.S. District Court case, United States v. Cundiff illustrates this
issue.77 Cundiffinvolved a father-son farming team that drained
a tract of land adjacent to abandoned coal mines and,
consequently, affected by acid-mine-drainage, to convert the
property to crop land.7 8 The property drained into two small
streams flowing into the Green River and then the Ohio.
7 9
Kentucky Division of Water, the Corps, and ultimately the EPA
cited their administrative orders, but the Cundiffs ignored the
agencies' administrative orders.80 The District Court's opinion
highlighted the tension between Justices Scalia and Kennedy by
offering quotes by each: Scalia dismissed Kennedy's test as
"simply rewrite[ing] the statute"81 while Kennedy stated that
74 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
75 Id.
76 The First Circuit noted in United States v. Johnson that either the Scalia test
or Kennedy test would determine whether wetlands qualify as "waters of the United
States." United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test controlled. See
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). The Eighth
Circuit in United States v. Bailey joined the First Circuit and found that the Corps had
Clean Water Act jurisdiction over wetlands if the wetlands met either of the tests cited in
Rapanos. See United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2009). The Fourth
Circuit in Precon Dev. Corp. v. US. Army Corps ofEng'rs held that it would follow
Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test, which governs and provides the formula for
determining whether the Corps has jurisdiction over site wetlands. Precon Dev. Corp. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2011).
77 See United States v. Cundiff, 480 F.Supp.2d 940, 947 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
78 Id. at 941.
79 Id.
s0 United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 205 (6th Cir. 2009).
81 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 756.
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Scalia read "nonexistent requirements into the Act." 8 2 The
tension expressed between the two Justices embodies the
uncertainty created by Congress in its original ambiguous
definition of navigable waters in the United States.
G. Sixth Circuit Interpretation
Upon review of Cundiff the Sixth Circuit spent
considerable time and effort describing the Marks rule in an
attempt to adopt the narrowest grounds of the Rapanos
decision.83 The Court found that it was almost impossible to find
the narrowest grounds on which at least five members concurred
in Rapanos.84 The Cundiff Court, in a well-written description of
the CWA's historical background and Section 404, explained the
complexities of the Rapanos decision, noting that "parsing any
one of Rapanos lengthy and statutory exegesis is taxing, but the
real difficulty comes in determining which, if any, of the three
main opinions lower courts should look to for guidance."8 5 Finding
that CWA jurisdiction was proper under both the Scalia and
Kennedy tests, the Court noted that it did not need to reach a
decision on whether either test applied.86 Rather, the Court
explained that the Supreme Court had recently denied certiorari
in two cases presenting the same question.87
II. AGENCIES (ONCE AGAIN) TRY TO PROVIDE "GUIDANCE"
As in 2003,88 and again in 2008 following Rapanos, the
EPA and the Corps attempted to provide guidance to regulated
communities regarding the jurisdictional water issue (i.e., 2008
Guidance).89 The agencies' scientists attempted to incorporate
82 Id. at 778.
8 Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208-209.
84 Id. at 208.
85 Id. at 207.
86 Id. at 210.
87 Id. ("... we leave ultimate resolution of the Marks-meets-Rapanos debate to a
future case that turns on which test in fact controls.").
88 See Advance Notion of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act
Regulatory Definition of "Waters of the United States", 68 Fed. Reg. 1991-01, 1995
(proposed Jan. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
89 Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the
US. Supreme Court's Decision inRapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States,
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technical definitions into the regulatory process with the primary
goal of reconciling the various Rapanos standards.90 The 2008
Guidance is especially focused on: (1) the protection of smaller
waters which feed larger bodies of water; and (2) the protection of
downstream water from upstream pollution. The Corps again
took on the task of providing a framework for implementing a
"legal standard" for complex hydrologic systems that would
satisfy ecological protection standards and private property
rights.9 1 The thirty-eight-page 2008 Guidance attempted to weave
a regulatory fabric covering all facts and circumstances in the
hydrologic system.92 While some waters are de facto jurisdictional
waters, others require significant technical and scientific
analysis. The agencies maintained that the 2008 Guidance was
consistent with the principles established by Supreme Court
precedent, and that it was supported by a scientific
understanding of how water bodies and watersheds function.93 It
addresses ix categories of waters subject to federal jurisdiction:
1. Traditional Navigable Waters: As discussed, traditional
"navigable waters" include "all waters which are in use,
were used, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or
foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide."94 Under the 2008
Guidance, "navigable waters" also include waters suitable
for commercial waterborne recreation.95
2. Interstate Waters: Any waters that flow across state lines
or form part of state boundaries are subject to Section 404
jurisdiction.96 Under this definition, lakes, ponds, or other
still-water features that cross state boundaries will be
deemed interstate waters in their entirety.97
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/fles/
2 01 6 -
02/documents/cwajurisdictionjfollowing-rapanosl20208.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNN9-
HKEG] (hereinafter, "2008 Guidance").
90 See id. at 1-2.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 4-5 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(1)).
96 See id. at 4-5.
97 Id.
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3. Significant Nexus Analysis Waters: Presenting perhaps
the most complicated situation, the agencies will assert
jurisdiction over waters that, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated waters in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, or biological
integrity of traditional navigable waters or interstate
waters. 9 Furthermore, the agencies have stated that they
will apply the significant nexus standard in a manner that
restores and maintains any of those three attributes.99
Clearly, there are many variables in such an analysis that
will likely require interpretation by the courts.
4. The Tributaries: The EPA and the Corps assert
jurisdiction over a tributary when the tributary
contributes to the flow of a traditional navigable or
interstate water, either directly or indirectly by means of
other tributaries. 100 The agencies have determined that a
tributary can be a natural, human-altered, or human-
made water body.101 A tributary is physically
characterized by the presence of a channel in a defined bed
and bank. 102
5. Adjacent Wetlands: Blending the Scalia and Kennedy
opinions, the agencies will assert jurisdiction over
"wetlands with a continuous surface connection" to
relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing
bodies of water connected to traditional navigable
waters.10 3 Further, the significant nexus test will require
jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands if they, either alone or
in combination with similarly situated wetlands, have an
effect on the chemical, physical or biological integrity of
traditional navigable waters or interstate waters, which is
more than "speculative or insubstantial."104 Interestingly,
the term "similarly situated" adjacent wetlands includes
all wetlands located in a particular watershed.1 0 5 It
98 Id. at 8.
9 See id. at 9-10.
100 Id. at 6-7.
101 Id. at 6 n.24.
102 Id. at 10.
10: Id. at 6-7.
04 Id. at 9, 11.
105 See id. 8-9.
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appears that this definition could lead to litigation
regarding distinct water features contained within the
same watershed, depending on the size of the
watershed.106
6. Other Waters: This catch-all includes waters such as
intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mud flats, sand flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes or natural ponds, if
the use, degradation, or destruction of those waters could
affect interstate or foreign commerce.107 The agencies,
recognizing that these "other waters" may be difficult to
generalize, have announced that they will make a case-by-
case, fact-specific determination of their jurisdiction over
them.10 Based on the history of litigation regarding
jurisdiction over waters on private property, the catch-all
provision is likely to spur additional litigation when an
unsuspecting property owner finds that hydrologic
features on his or her property have been determined to be
"other waters."
Despite the agency's intent to provide clarification of the
Rapanos decision, significant pressure continued from Congress,
industry, trade organizations, environmental organizations,
natural resource extraction companies, and state and local
governments to replace the 2008 Guidance with a properly
promulgated regulation defining the scope of waters protected by
the CWA. Interestingly, although the 2008 Guidance instructs
the Corps on how to make jurisdictional determinations that
comply with the Rapanos decision, the 2008 Guidance itself
expressly explains it "does not impose legally binding
requirements ... and may not apply to a particular situation
depending on the circumstances."09
106 See, e.g., Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 278 (4th
Cir. 2011).
107 See 2008 Guidance at 2-3.
108 See id. at 4-5.
109 Id. at 4 n.17.
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III. THE 2015 "WOTUS" RULE
Following continued pressure and resistance to the 2008
Guidance, and to provide further certainty in developing
regulations during the Obama administration, the EPA proposed
and promulgated a final rule which further defined the scope of
waters of the United States in June 2015.110 In the "2015 WOTUS
Rule," agencies attempted to refine the definition of "waters of
the United States" through increased use of so-called bright-line
boundaries "to make the process of identifying waters protected
under the CWA easier to understand, more predictable, and more
consistent with the law and peer-reviewed science.""1 The
agencies explained that the 2015 WOTUS Rule was consistent
with legal rulings and science concerning the inter-connectedness
of tributaries, wetlands, and other waters to downstream waters
and effects of those connections on the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of downstream waters.112 The Rule also
focused on clarifying the regulatory status of surface waters
located in isolated places in a landscape, and small streams and
rivers that flow for only part of the year. Acknowledging the
difficulty in developing a succinct regulatory framework, the
agencies noted that "science cannot in all cases provide bright
lines to interpret and implement policy."1 13 The 2015 WOTUS
Rule, not surprisingly, was highly criticized by many parties and
judicial review was sought in thirty-one states by multiple
industry organizations and environmental groups across the
United States.
A. A Jurisdictional Side Trip: Back to the Supreme Court
Due to ambiguity within the CWA's own provisions for
venue and judicial review, regulatory challenges were brought in
10 See 80 Fed. Reg. 37054, at *37056-57 (June 29, 2015).
" Id.
112 Id. at *37056.
" See id. at *37057 ("The science demonstrates that waters fall along a gradient
of chemical, physical, and biological connection to traditional navigable waters, and it is
the agencies' task to determine where along that gradient to draw lines of jurisdiction
under the CWA. In making this determination, the agencies must rely, not only on the
science, but also on their technical expertise and practical experience in implementing the
CWA during a period of over 40 years.").
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federal District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal around the
nation.114 The federal district court of North Dakota issued a
preliminary injunction on a petition by thirteen state challengers,
finding they were likely to succeed on their claims that the
proposed rule violated statutory authority and that the EPA
failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act's
rulemaking requirements.15
Following the decision, the Sixth Circuit received four
actions that were transferred to and then consolidated by the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation as a multi-circuit case
involving a challenge by eighteen additional states to the validity
of the 2015 WOTUS Rule.116 Although the Sixth Circuit
recognized it might not have jurisdiction to review the Rule, as
discussed in the dissent of Judge Keith, it balanced all of the
factors and concluded that the status quo should prevail pending
jurisdictional review.117 Illustrating the confusion regarding
venue for judicial review under the CWA, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals stayed the 2015 WOTUS Rule nationwide and
restored the "pre-2015 rule" pending further judicial review.118
The court noted, "what is of greater concern to us, in balancing
the harms, is the burden-potentially visited nationwide on
governmental bodies, state and federal as well as private parties
and the impact on the public in general, implicated by the Rule's
effective redrawing of jurisdictional lines over certain of the
nation's waters.""i9 As further acknowledgement and perhaps a
repudiation of the status quo, the court acknowledged that "given
that the definitions of 'navigable waters' and 'waters of the
United States' have been clouded by uncertainty, in spite of (or
exacerbated by) a series of Supreme Court decisions over the last
thirty years, we appreciate the need for the new Rule."1
20 The
court noted "a stay temporarily silences the whirlwind of
114 There are two paths for judicial review: (1) parties may file challenges to final
EPA actions in federal district courts, generally under the Administrative Procedures Act,
5 U.S.C. § 704; and (2) as described in the CWA, seven categories of EPA actions for which
judicial review lies exclusively in the federal courts of appeal, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
11 North Dakota v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1051 (D.N.D.
2015).
16 See In re U.S. Dep't of Defense, 817 F. 3d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 2016).
" In re Envtl. Prot. Agency, 803 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2015).
11s Id.
11 Id.
120 Id. (emphasis added).
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confusion that springs from uncertainty about the requirements
of the new Rule and whether they will survive legal testing."121
Hence, the agencies continue to make jurisdictional
determinations based on the 2008 Guidance.
B. Supreme Court Jurisdictional Holding
Following the stay and succinct expressions of the need for
certainty across the nation, the matter was directed to the United
States Supreme Court in National Association of Manufacturers
v. Department ofDefense, which was decided in January 2018. 122
The issue preserted to the Supreme Court, diverting from the
definition of "waters of the United States," concerned which
federal court-the Districts Courts or the Courts of Appeal-
challenges to the Rule would be heard.123 In National Association
of Manufacturers, the court again recited the complex and
frustrating history of the CWA definitions and ultimately found,
after significant parsing through the statute and ambiguous
legislative history, that the Courts of Appeal did not have
jurisdiction to hear challenges to rulemaking. 124 Nowhere does
the CWA allow challenges to rulemaking to be heard in the
Circuit Courts of Appeal, although they have original jurisdiction
in seven defined areas.125 The court failed to find that the CWA's
judicial review provisions, cited by the government as allowing
Circuit Court venue, applied to rulemaking.126 Both provisions
cited by the government related to approving or promulgating
effluent limitations or denying NPDES permits.12 7 Hinting that
the venue provision in the CWA was questionable, in a final
expression of frustration regarding the ambiguity in the statute,
Justice Sotomayor stated, "jurisdiction is governed by the intent
of Congress and not by any views we may have about sound
policy."1128
121 Id.
122 Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers v. Dep't of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 633-34
(2018).
23 Id. at 624-25.
124 Id. at 633-34.
125 Id. at 632.
126 Id. at 631-32.
127 Id. at 629.
1
2
8Id. at 634 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 745
(1985)).
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IV. REVERSE DIRECTION
A. Executive Order
Notwithstanding the continued litigation regarding the
2015 WOTUS Rule, in February 2017, President Donald Trump
issued an Executive Order entitled "Restoring the Rule of Law,
Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the 'Waters of
the United States' Rule."129 The Order itself directed the agencies
to consider interpreting the term "navigable waters" in a manner
consistent with Justice Scalia's interpretation in Rapanos.130 The
EPA proposed a two-step process to provide certainty across the
country. Step one was an initial rulemaking to maintain the legal
status quo by proposing to rescind the 2015 WOTUS Rule and'
recodify the regulation as it was in place prior to its issuance. 131
The new rule would in essence implement the Sixth Circuit stay
results.132 Step two was the agency's plan to propose a new
definition interpreting the jurisdictional bounds of the CWA that
would replace the much broader approach of the 2015 WOTUS
Rule, which is consistent with Justice Scalia's view regarding
"relatively permanent waters and wetlands with a continuous
surface connection to relatively permanent waters."33
B. Latest Rulemaking: Maintaining Status Quo
Although the Sixth Circuit's nationwide stay halted
implementation of the 2015 WOTUS Rule, the Supreme Court
determined in National Association of Manufacturers that U.S.
Courts of Appeal did not have original jurisdiction to review these
challenges.134 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit lacked the authority to
issue the stay (as forecasted in the dissent). The status of other
continuing cases over the 2015 WOTUS Rule are pending,
129 See Exec. Order No. 13778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 (March 3, 2017).
130 Id. at 12497.
131 See Definition of "Waters of the United States"-Recodification of Pre-
Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34899-01 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R.
pt. 328).
132 Id
133Id.
134 Nat'1 Ass'n of Manufacturers v. Dep't of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 633-34
(2018).
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creating even more procedural confusion regarding the 2015
WOTUS Rule. To avoid the confusion in the lower courts
regarding the applicability of the 2015 WOTUS Rule, the EPA
promulgated its final rule on February 6, 2018, to thwart the
possibility that the 2015 WOTUS Rule could be implemented in
some states but not others following National Association of
Manufacturers.135 In the final rule, to provide continuity and
regulatory certainty for regulated entities, the agencies intend to
maintain the status quo by adding an applicability date of
February 6, 2020.136 Immediately after the publication of the
"applicability date extension," litigation was filed opposing the
new "applicability date" implementation of the 2015 WOTUS
Rule across the nation.
Step one was completed with the publication of the Final
Rule re-codifying the preexisting rule on February 6, 2018, which
was intended to maintain the status quo by adding an
applicability date to the 2015 WOTUS Rule of February 6,
2020.137 Therefore, the regulations and related guidance
documents stemming from the Rapanos decision were reinstated
notwithstanding the ambiguity arising therefrom. Step two in the
process of actually redefining the key terms, it appears, will be
like the hydrologic cycle itself-another reiteration of the
"rulemaking-litigation-rulemaking-litigation" processes that
determine what Congress meant in defining "navigable waters"
as "waters of the United States."
135 See Definition of "Waters of the United States" - Addition of an Applicability
Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200-01 (proposed Feb. 6, 2018) (to be
codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
136 Id.
137 Id.
